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ICC and Africa 
 
Substantive jurisdiction 
 
By prof. mr André Klip, professor of Criminal law, criminal procedure and international 
criminal law 
 
Introduction 
The Statute of the International Criminal Court provides three crimes over which the 
Court has jurisdiction: genocide (art.6), crimes against humanity (art.7) and war crimes 
(art.8). In addition to that, article 5, paragraph 2 of the Statute stipulates that the court 
may also exercise jurisdiction over the crime of agression once a provision defining the 
crime has been adopted. Since this has not been done yet, I will not speculate on how 
agression might be formulated. 
 
In this contribution I will therefore focus on the three crimes mentioned and concentrate 
on future issues that could lead to (legal) disputes or  issues that would necessitate 
further clarification.1 The second angle from which I would like to approach the 
substantive jurisdiction under the ICC Statute is the extent to which developments are 
specifically African. Having regard to pecularities of Africa is justified for the following 
reasons. Firstly, it is likely that the first cases before the ICC are going to be African 
cases. There are quite some conflicts going on that could qualify for application of the 
ICC Statute. Secondly, the international political situation stimulates a closer look 
towards Africa in the sense that world powers (or better to say: the world power) are/ is 
not dominantly involved in the conflicts in Africa. It is therefore likely that the accused 
will be African (and not for instance US or EU nationals). Thirdly, there is a good 
ratification rate among African states. Fourthly, it is likely that African states lack the 
infrastructure for prosecution and will easily fulfil the requirement of being unable to 
prosecute (art. 17, par. 1 sub a ICC Statute). 
 
As a consequence, the progress and development of international criminal law and the 
effectiveness of the ICC will be determined in Africa, not in Europe or Asia and 
certainly not in the Americas. 
 
Construction of Criminal Responsibility 
Although the Statute offers definitions of the crimes in articles 6, 7 and 8, this is 
insufficient to determine criminal responsibility. On the basis of article 9 ICC Statute 
the socalled Elements of Crimes have been formulated. This set of rules “shall assist the 
Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8.” One could regard these 
Elements of Crimes as an attempt to supply the ICC Statute with a general part. What is 
a general part? In the general part, a criminal justice system defines who is subject to 
criminal law (e.g. natural persons (excluding children below a certain age) and (in some 
natural criminal justice systems) legal entities, contrary to animals as was the case 
before the middle ages); whether the conduct is criminal in the sense that it falls within 
                                                          
1 This contribution will not deal in detail with every aspect of the crimes mentioned. 
the definition of a specific crime; whether the suspect qualifies as a direct perpetrator 
(and thus has committed the crime itself) or as an indirect perpetrator. By allowing for 
the criminalisation of indirect perpetrators a criminal justice system will define forms of 
participation to the crime, such as accessories, instigators, aiders and abettors etc.; the 
general part also deals with circumstances in which no punishment may take place due 
to internal (e.g. insanity) or external (e.g. emergency) circumstances of the offence. This 
may lead to the conclusion that either in the specific circumstances of the case the 
behaviour was not illegal, or that the illegal behaviour cannot be reproached to the 
perpetrator. This aspect deals with the concepts of defences and excuses; Finally, a 
general part determines jurisdictional matters. What justifies the applicability of specific 
national legislation? The fact that the conduct took place on its territory? The fact that 
the perpetrator or the victim is one of its nationals? Or is there room for extra-territorial 
or even universal application of national criminal law? 
 
The general part of criminal law can be regarded as the foundation on which each 
criminal justice system is built. Most jurisdictions have therefore codified the general 
part in the first section of their Penal Code.2 This general part is subsequently followed 
by a much more voluminous part with specific incriminations, the so called special part. 
In the special part we find the definitions and penalties of all crimes: for murder, for 
theft etc. The general part derives its notion “general” from the fact that is applicable to 
all specific crimes. To a certain extent one can describe the general part and the specific 
incrimination as the two coordinates that determine criminal responsibility. 
 
The Elements of Crimes further clarify the meaning of the provisions on substantive 
criminal law. Because of the fact that the definitions of the crimes are similar to 
definitions used earlier in for instance the ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute, it raises 
the question whether the case law of these and other tribunals, such as the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone and the East Timor Special Panels can be used as a source of reference 
and interpretation for the ICC. In this context it is interesting to see that articles 6, 7 and 
8 all use the same wording: “for the purposes of this Statute”.3 Why has this been done? 
This makes it clear that other definitions of the crimes remain applicable in the context 
for which those definitions were drafted. A consequence of any difference is of course 
that added value of the case law of the other international and internationalised tribunals 
mentioned is limited to the extent that the definitions of the crimes do not differ. 
 
Genocide 
Genocide is regarded as the crime of crimes by both ad hoc tribunals.4 It is the most 
superior crime. It requires a special intent of the perpetrator. He wants to kill victims 
because they belong to a certain (national/ ethnical/ racial/ religious) group. Victims are 
selected by the perpetrator not as individuals but because of their membership to a 
specific group. The crime of genocide was drafted after the second world war. The 
atrocities comitted by nazi-Germany on the European jews modelled the 1948 Genocide 
Convention.5
 
                                                          
2 In this sense it is striking that none of the statutes of international criminal tribunals has done that. 
3 Art. 6, par. 1, art.7, par. 1 and art.8, par. 2 ICC Statute. 
4 ICTR, Sentence, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999, T. 
Ch.II, Klip/ Sluiter, Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals, Vol. II, p.695. 
5 Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, UNTS 78, 
277 and 317 UTS 319. See also William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, Cambridge 
University Press 2000. 
In my opinion two possible future issues deserve further attention. The first is the 
question of whether an individual can individually commit genocide or whether 
concerted action is required. The second is what the requirements are for the special 
intent. 
 
Isolated acts and acts of an individual 
The main question is whether an individual can commit genocide by commission of 
isolated acts. This seems to be ruled out by the Elements of Crimes: “the conduct took 
place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct.” This makes clear that 
there can be no isolated act that qualifies as genocide, even if the perpetrator in question 
had the requisite special intent to kill a certain group of people. I doubt whether this 
interpetration in the Elements of Crimes will be flexible enough to cope with future 
technical developments. Unfortunately the possession of atomic, biological and 
chemical weapons is no longer exclusively under the control of states. 
 
What I deduct from the Elements of Crimes is that it is not necessary to kill huge 
numbers of victims, as long as it fits into a pattern of conduct. What is necessary, 
though, is that the conduct must form a serious attempt. The Elements of Crimes 
determine that the conduct could itself effect the destruction of the group. In this context 
it is also relevant to see that the acts listed in the Statute are not enumerative. The 
Statute stipulates that “any of the following acts” shall be considered as genocide. There 
is a certain pressure to expand the protection of this crime by accepting other acts as 
falling within the definition. The ICTR demonstrated that be bringing rape under the 
definition of genocide.6
 
The second issue that may come up is whether dolus eventualis may also qualify as 
special intent required under genocide. With dolus eventualis it is meant that although 
the initiative to commit genocide may not have come from the perpetrator he 
deliberately and voluntarily engaged himself in conduct of which he knew that it would 
contribute to genocide. Examples of this from the second world war are the 
participation of certain German enterprises in the construction of gas chambers and the 
production of gas. 
 
Current practices of the use of radio-active material, as well as the exploitation of oil 
and gas fields may deprive entire groups of their natural home lands, may seriously 
inflict the conditions of life and destruct the population in whole or in part. Another 
example is the cutting of the rain forest which may have similar effects. The examples 
given also demonstrate that it is time to think over the question whether legal entities 
may also be criminally liable.  
 
Crimes Against Humanity 
Article 7 of the ICC Statute describes which acts fall under the heading of crimes 
against humanity. Like with genocide, also this list is not enumerative since sub k 
stipulates that “other inhumane acts” may be regarded as a crime against humanity. 
Further explanation of the elements of this crime is given in two instances. In paragraph 
2 of article 7 itself as well as in the Elements of Crimes. 
 
                                                          
6 ICTR, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998, Klip/ Sluiter, 
Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals, Vol. II, p.531-536. 
The discretion of bringing other acts under the definition of crimes against humanity is 
not unlimited. Article 22, paragraph 2 ICC Statute sets the standard here: “The 
definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In 
case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being 
investigated, prosecuted or convicted.” 
 
With regard to the crime of apartheid it is remarkable that the ICC Statute did not copy 
the definition from the Anti-Apartheid Convention. The reason could be that the state 
based system of apartheid as practised in South Africa no longer exists. The 
consequence of that reference is that a new interpretation will have to be given. In this 
context the question comes up whether the treatment of Papuas in Irian Jaya by 
Indonesia falls under the crime of apartheid. Similar situations are for the Tibetians in 
China, white farmers in Zimbabwe and the aboriginals in Australia. 
 
According to the Elements of Crime with regard to extermination, it includes the 
deprivation of access to food and medicine. What about not supplying food or anti Aids-
medicine to countries and population in need? 
 
Further questions can be raised with regard to “attack directed against any civilian 
population”. Also here the question must be raised whether this rules out an individual 
act. Paragraph 2 requires multiple commission of acts and seems to rule out a single 
strike. Do terrorist acts, such as the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York 
qualify as an attack in this sense? In light of the further explanation of attack, given in 
paragraph 2 of the article my answer is positive. It further defines that an attack may be 
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy to commit such an 
attack”. There can be hardly any discussion about the definition of a state. The 
“organizational policy” distinguishes itself from the state. Does this relate to formal 
organisations, such as the African Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation? Or 
can this provision also be applied with regard to informal organisations, such as Al 
Queda or separatist movements. 
 
 
War crimes 
War crimes can be considered as the broadest category of all international crimes. The 
definition distinguishes between various categories: 
- grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions (protected persons) 
- other serious violations in international conflict 
- Common Article 3 violations in armed not of an international character 
- Other serious violations in armed conflict not of an international character 
The provision on war crimes does not apply to internal disturbances and tensions. 
 
It is interesting to see that the Elements of Crime require knowledge with the 
perpetrator of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict. 
The Elements of Crime further adapted to the development in the case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals that it is not required that the perpetrator was able to qualify whether he 
participated in an internal or international conflict. 
 
 
Overlap of specific crimes 
There is a general tendency to expand the remit of the definition of all crimes. The 
ICTR and ICTY have not been extremely restrictive in their interpretation of definitions 
of crimes and their definition of individual and command responsibility. Although this 
may lead to a more extensive protection of the rights of individuals it raises new 
problems of demarkation between the various international crimes. Two examples of 
overlaps may illustrate this, many others could have been given. There is an overlap of 
genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity. There is an overlap of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes with regard to rape.7
 
What is or could be the problem if the ICC were not able to resist this development? It 
will lead to cumulative charging and cumulative convictions. It requires the regulation 
of concursus idealis because a conviction will be based on the same material facts. 
 
Such a practice leaves certain ambiguity as to rights protected by the prohibtion of a 
certain crime. There is a fair risk that we will end up with a hotch-potch of international 
crimes without any clear distinction. 
International tribunals should be more restrictive in their interpretation and be able to 
specify what the values protected by each specific crime are. Only then is it possible to 
make clear why certain acts are universally seen as international crime. It should be 
abundantly clear what makes an individual murder or rape a crime against humanity and 
how it distinguishes crimes against humanity from genocide.  
 
Penalties 
A few remarks on article 77 ICC Statute that deals with the penalties. It provides for 
two types of sanctions: imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not 
exceed a maximum of 30 years; and life imprisonment. Although this is already much 
more than any previous statute of an international criminal tribunal provided, it is 
questionable whether this fulfils the requirements of nullum poena sine lege. Two 
problems appear at the horizon here. The first is that there is no sentencing policy. From 
the sentences imposed by the ICTY it is impossible to deduct a policy with sufficiently 
predictability. This is different with the ICTR, but at that tribunal most accused are 
convicted of genocide for which the ICTR imposes life imprisonment. One may even 
question whether the grave nature of the crimes for which the ICC is competent allow 
for anything else but a very harsh sentence. 
 
The second problem is that the court/ judges at the moment of sentencing do not know 
what happens to the sentence once it is imposed. They do not have any information as to 
the state that will execute the sentence. The penitentiary position of a convicted person 
will be entirely different in Mali or in Norway even if the duration of the sentence may 
be exactly the same. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Former international criminal tribunals were given a substantive jurisdiction 
competence specifically drafted for the relevant conflict. With the establishment of the 
ICC this is different. It will be interesting to see what the consequences of that are for 
the ICC’s effectiveness and success. 
                                                          
7 See ICTR, Judgement and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, T.Ch.I, 6 
December 1999, Klip/ Sluiter, Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals, Vol. II, 
p.709. See my commentary on these type of cases on p.787. 
 
Article 26 ICC Statute excludes jurisdiction over persons under 18 years. Although that 
is certainly in line with various the competences of most international triunals, it is 
questionable whether this corresponds to specific African situations. In many African 
conflicts, child soldiers play an important role. This raises the question as to their 
accountability. The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone specifically provided 
jurisdiction over minors. 
 
A final remark is on the ICC as a source of inspiration and guidance for national courts. 
Following the principle of complementarity, the ICC should only act if states are 
unwilling or unable to prosecute crimes.8 The Statute does send the message that the 
first task is for the states and certainly not for the ICC. The structure of the ICC Statute 
emphasises the criminal liability of leaders (military and civil) by the requirement of 
knowledge of a plan or policy. This focuses on the prosecution of the leadership in each 
conflict. A consequence that can already be found in the prosecution practice of both the 
ICTR and the ICTY. For the Special Court for Sierra Leone it is even stipulated in the 
Statute itself. 
 
One of the consequences is that international criminal tribunals do not deal with 
representative cases but with similar cases. In cases related to the leadership of 
international crimes entirely different  issues with regard to criminal responsibility come 
up than in cases with small fish. Hardly any of the superiors did kill, rape or set fire to 
houses themselves. Their criminal responsibility is construed with the establishment of 
a line of responsibility with the person who actually killed, raped or burnt the house. It 
is much more likely that questions with regard to defences and excuses will be raised in 
cases against individual soldiers than in cases against ministers and generals. In a more 
retoric way the question is whether one could imagine Milosevic to plead that he acted 
under duress. In combination with the political tendency to leave political sensitive 
cases (i.e. cases against the political or military elite) to the ICC, the ICC will have 
exclusively high profile cases. As a consequence of this development the ICC case law 
will not give any guidance regarding the peculiarities of cases regarding minor 
perpetrators. National courts will subsequently have to decide such issues completely on 
their own. This will result in many different practices and certainly not further the equal 
treatment of perpetrators. This will be to detriment of the development of international 
criminal law. This could be conterbalanced if the ICC were willing to monitor the 
policy of the prosecution in bringing cases before it.  
                                                          
8 See André Klip, Complementarity and Concurrent Jurisdiction, 19 Nouvelles Etudes Pénales 2004, 
p.173-197. 
